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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
refusing altogether to assess such damages."' 9 Moreover, if the de-
fendant wrongfully discharges the plaintiff, he should be taken to
have understood that if he did not wish to be subjected to such
damages, he should have kept his agreement.20
It is submitted that the court in Freeman was correct in recog-
nizing the inadequacies of the Smith and Robinson decisions. The
court has now set the stage so that in the next case raising the issue
counsel should present the reasons supporting the majority rule
which allows damages for the entire contract period. When this
occurs the court will probably adopt the sounder majority rule.
JAmES ALFRED MANNINO
Corporations-Specific Enforcement of Shareholder Agreements
Shareholder voting agreements to achieve control of a corpora-
tion are generally recognized as lawful.' Difficulty arises, however,
when a shareholder breaches a voting agreement, and the court is
faced with the dilemma of awarding the inadequate relief of money
damages,2 or specifically enforcing the agreement, thereby substi-
tuting the court's direction for the will of the majority.
10 LABATT § 363(e), at 1145.
" E.g., Granow v. Adler, 24 Ariz. 53, 206 Pac. 590 (1922) ; Seymour v.
Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909); Carter v. Gillette, 163 Mass.
95, 39 N.E. 1010 (1895).
'Voting agreements should be distinguished from voting trusts. Voting
trusts are created by the transfer of shares to trustees, who vote these
shares as dictated by the agreement. Statutes now usually control both the
formation and duration of these agreements. If a voting trust is inconsistent
with the statute it is generally held void. Voting agreements are contracts
among shareholders to vote stock in a specified manner. Typically, statutory
control is not present. HENN, CORPORATxONS §§ 199-200 (1961).
Shareholders may combine to gain control of a corporation so long as
"[T]hey do not contravene any express charter or statutory provision or
contemplate any fraud, oppression or wrong against other stockholders or
other illegal objects." Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 320, 119 N.E. 559,
561 (1918) (dictum). See, e.g., Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry. Co.,
115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897); Bator v. United Sausage Co., 138 Conn.
18, 81 A.2d 442 (1951); Wolf v. Arant, 88 Ga. App. 568, 77 S.E.2d 116
(1953); E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288
(1954); Trefethan v. Amazeen, 93 N.H. 110, 36 A.2d 266 (1944); Katcher
v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (1953); Clark v. Dodge, 269
N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
Courts often recognize the legality of shareholder agreements in a nega-
tive manner, by stating that the "contract is not per se invalid." For a
collection of such cases see Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 799, 802-04 (1956). See
Generally 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2064 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1952).
Compare E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d
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In Weil v. Berseth3 the shareholders of a close corporation
agreed to elect each other directors. The by-laws were to be amended
to provide one seat on the board of directors for each of the four
shareholders, with no further amendments to "by-laws so adopted"
except by unanimous consent. Ten years later, in 1965, 4 three of
the shareholders voted to adopt new by-laws increasing the mem-
bership of the board of directors to five, and allowing amendments
to by-laws by a majority vote of the board. The fourth shareholder
objected and sued for specific enforcement of the agreement. The
court held that plaintiff was entitled to an injunction ordering a
stockholders' meeting to be called, at which the defendants would
vote their stock: (1) to re-enact the repealed by-laws, (2) to repeal
by-laws inconsistent with the original agreement, (3) to remove
from the board of directors the power to amend certain by-laws.
The court further indicated that plaintiff was entitled to injunctive
relief to preserve the status quo, and if it seemed necessary, to in-
junctive relief requiring that the added director resign.
Two problems pervade most voting agreement disputes: legal-
ity' of the contract and, more perplexing, the remedy available in
case of breach.' Courts of equity traditionally have refused to spe-
288 (1954) (implication that money damages could be awarded), with Ring-
ling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 29 Del. Ch. 318,
49 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1946) (granting specific performance).
'- Conn. -, 220 A.2d 456 (1966).
'The Connecticut statute was amended during this period to redefine
voting agreements. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-339(b) (1961). For an
analysis of how these amendments affect a Connecticut close corporation see
Cross, The Close Corporation in Connecticut, 35 CoNr. B.J. 432 (1961).
' See note 1 supra. Some cases invalidate these agreements because they
sever ownership from voting control and are thus contrary to the corporate
norm of rule by majority vote. Additionally, it has been argued that the
party voting the stock might not be interested in the corporation's welfare.
See, e.g., Palmbaum v. Magulsky, 217 Mass. 306, 104 N.E. 746 (1914);
Roberts v. Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
Mutual promises most often serve as consideration in such contracts, but
at least two courts have indicated a need for consideration in addition to
mutual promises to gain specific enforcement. See, e.g., Johnson v. Spartan-
burg County Fair Ass'n, 210 S.C. 56, 41 S.E.2d 599 (1947); Roberts v.
Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
'If a proxy is revocable there can be no specific enforcement since the
parties could withdraw at will from the contract. Proxies are generally
said to be revocable unless coupled with an interest. 5 FLETCHER, Cyco-
PEDIA Cop.oRAioxs § 2062 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952). This reasoning
which developed from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Hunt v.
Rousmanier's Adm'rs, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174, (1823), has proven to be
an inadequate basis for finding irrevocable proxies. See, e.g., Smith v. San
Francisco & N.P. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897) (court found
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cifically enforce such agreements.' Such reluctance can be traced to
a narrow concept of the judicial power available for enforcement s
and to certain norms concerning the proper form of corporate opera-
tions. 9 Recent cases, however, indicate an evolving favorable atti-
tude toward specific enforcement. 10 Courts have begun to recognize
the problem of applying laws designed primarily for large publicly-
held corporations to closely-held corporations. The result has been a
liberal interpretation of corporation law to enable close corporations
an implied agency on the part of the non-defaulting party to a shareholder
agreement to vote the shares of the defaulting party; this was coupled with
reliance on the agreement to hold the proxy irrevocable). One commentator
suggests that "[S]pecific performance of voting agreements . . . should de-
pend neither on the finding of an elusive 'interest', nor on the creation of a
fictional implied agency. Rather, the criterion . . . should simply be its
appropriateness as a remedy in a specific case." 15 U. Ci. L. Rav. 738, 743(1948). Statutes adopted in some states have been used to clarify the
nature of the interest needed to uphold irrevocable proxies. See Folk, Re-
visiting the North Carolina Corporation Law: The Robinson Treatise Re-
viewed and the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C.L. Rav. 768, 825 (1965).
5 FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2067 (penn. ed. rev. repl.
1952). But see, 15 U. CGi. L. Rv. 738, 743 & n.27 (1948) (questioning
the rule that courts of equity will not specifically enforce shareholder agree-
ments).
'See, e.g., Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 651, 197 S.W. 376, 383(1917) (dictum) where the court indicated that equity will not specifically
enforce where to do so will create complicated and difficult problems.
[A] court of equity will not undertake the specific performance of a
contract which is impossible of performance. If a contract be treated
as valid ... difficult questions must arise in its enforcement. As an
instance: Has the court power to direct stockholders how they shall
vote in their selection of directors, and can it instruct directors how
to vote in the election of officers to the corporation?
Ibid.
' The problem with these entrepreneurs [close corporations] . . . is
to reconcile.., aims with corporate norms which have been so often
stated as prerequisites of corporate existence. These norms--original-
ly formulated to protect the investing shareholder in large corpora-
tions-include control of corporate activities by a board of directors,
rule by majority vote, free transferability of ownership shares, and
continuity of organizational life not terminated by the death or with-
drawal of a participant.
Hornstein, Stockholders Agreements in Closely Held Corporations, 59 YALE
L.J. 1040 (1950). See also Gage v. Fisher, 5 N.D. 297, 303, 65 N.W. 809,
811 (1895) (dictum). This case implies denial of specific performance where
a shareholder agrees to surrender his right to control corporate activities
to another party.
2" See, e.g., Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47
Pac. 582 (1897); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v.
Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (1946); Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d
16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964) ; Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d
180 (1953); Baren v. Baren, 59 Pa. D. & C. 556 (C.P. 1947). Few cases
hold explicitly that specific enforcement of a shareholder voting agreement
is available as a remedy. Most decisions are not directed toward this ques-
tion, but focus on injunctive remedies.
(Vol. 45
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to operate with many of the characteristics of partnerships. The
courts have "relaxed their attitudes concerning statutory compliance
when dealing with close corporation behavior, permitting 'slight de-
viations' from the corporate 'norms' in order to give legal efficacy to
common business practice."'" Some states have adopted statutes
focused directly at close corporations, or at least favorable to their
operations." Wyoming has enacted a unique statute which pro-
vides for the specific enforcement of shareholder agreements.1
Given the goal of many shareholder agreements-to bring part-
nership attributes to close corporations-specific enforcement pre-
sents a quandary. If the court enforces such an agreement the
shareholders are pressed into a judicially enforced intimacy contrary
to a basic principle of partnership law, that of dissolution at will. 4
A forced relationship produces friction among the parties, and is
not conducive to the efficient operation of the enterprise. Further,
if a personal service contract is involved, and a party wishes to
withdraw from the agreement, the requirement of specific perfor-
mance approaches involuntary servitude.' Conversely, if the court
fails to specifically enforce shareholder agreements, there being no
other adequate remedy, the advantages of operating as a partner-
ship are lost.' Also informal agreements carried over into the in-
"Galler v. Galler, 32 I1. 2d 16, 29, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (1964).
12 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 § 157.33 (Supp. 1965); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 608.0100-.0107 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (c)(1965); N.Y. Bus. Coa. LAw § 620.
" In an action by a shareholder who is a party to such an agreement
a court of competent jurisdiction may enjoin another party or parties
to such agreement from voting his or their shares in violation thereof,
and the court may, in an action to which the corporation is a party
by appropriate decree set aside an election of directors or other ac-
tion resulting from the voting of shares in violation of such agree-
ment, and in addition the court may grant such other or further relief
as is appropriate under the circumstances for the enforcement of such
agreement.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.31 (1965). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-
339(b) (1961); TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 230(b) (Supp. 1966).
"UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 31.
"But see In the Matter of Staldinski, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959) where specific enforcement of an employment con-
tract was granted.
" These advantages may include "[P]ower to allocate managerial author-
ity in line with the talents of the owners and the dictates of their business
and financial bargain; to assure each participant a share of the fruits which
corresponded to his contribution, not only of funds but, of energy and man-
agerial ability; to permit a considerable degree of choice of business asso-
ciates." Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARV. L.
Ruv. 1532, 1534 (1960).
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corporated partnership are dissolved, and formal methods such as
voting trusts must be used to maintain these former arrangements.1'
Although most commentators and some recent cases have recog-
nized the necessity for specific enforcement if the agreement is to
be effective,' relatively few cases directly deny or grant, 9 as did
Weil, specific performance. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com-
bined Shows v. Ringling ° and Abercrombie v. Davies,2' both de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Delaware, are perhaps the leading
cases in the United States dealing with shareholder voting agree-
ments; yet in neither case was the issue of specific performance
directly decided. In Ringling instead of enforcing the agreement
the Delaware Supreme Court merely disallowed the votes of share-
holders breaching it.2 2 The same court in Abercrombie held the
agreement invalid because it was in substance a voting trust and
failed to comply with statutory requirements.23 By refusing to face
the issue, both cases denied specific enforcement and thereby up-
held the old common law rule. The court in Ringling has been criti-
cized for ignoring the intent of the parties as manifested by the
agreement2 4 and for discouraging the use of voting agreements by
confusing prospective parties to such contracts on what remedy
would be available on breach , but the decision might be explained
17 15 U. Cai. L. Rav. 738, 744 (1948).8 E.g., HENN, CORPOATIONS § 200 (1961).
1" See note 11 supra. See Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corpo-
ration, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1536 (1960); 15 U. CHi. L. Rav. 738, 743(1948).
29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947), reversing 29 Del. Ch.
318, 49 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1946). Two of the three shareholders of a close
corporation entered an agreement to vote their stock together to achieve
control of the corporation. Any disputes were to be submitted to an arbi-
trator whose decision on the manner in which votes were to be cast was to
be binding on both parties. When one shareholder refused to vote as directed
by the arbitrator, a suit for specific performance of the agreement resulted.
21 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957), reversing 36 Del. Ch.
102, 125 A.2d 588 (Ch. 1956); 35 Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (Ch. 1956);
see 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 961 (1959). Shareholders of the majority of stock of
a corporation agreed to execute an agent's agreement under which they
could gain control of the board of directors. This was achieved by provid-
ing that seven of the eight agents could cast the votes of the whole block,
and that disputes would be arbitrated. The action arose when shareholders
who were not parties to the agreement moved to have the agreement de-
clared invalid because it placed control in the minority of the board, and
made the board a mere sham.2229 Del. Ch. 610, 624, 53 A.2d 441, 448 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
" 36 Del. Ch. 371, 386, 130 A.2d 338, 347 (Sup. Ct 1957).
2 
LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 320 (1959).
2" 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 738, 744 (1948).
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by the court's reluctance to force parties into a relationship which
they no longer desireY6 The result in Abercrombie was the same as
in Ringling, and both cases have clouded the issue of specific en-
forcement.
Part of the confusion may be traced to the fact that both cases
reversed well-reasoned decisions by a progressive court of chancery.
In Ringling, Chancellor Seitz, argued that specific performance was
the only equitable remedy, and that denial of this remedy would
make the agreement invalid.27 This is similar to the reasoning in
Weil that money damnages were inadequate and that specific perfor-
mance would lie.28 In Abercrombie, ten years later, Chancellor Seitz
found a valid pooling agreement,29 and most recently, in 1963 he
specifically enforced an agreement to form a voting trust.30 Thus
the Court of Chancery has been one of the leading advocates of the
specific enforcement of voting agreements. Neither Weil nor the
leading Delaware cases engaged in any policy discussion on specific
enforceability beyond stating that that remedy was the most "ade-
quate or equitable" and should be awarded. It may be conjectured
that these cases were based on policy considerations similar to those
expressed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Galler v. Galler.8 '
While the shareholder of a public-issue corporation may readily
sell his shares on the open market should management fail to use,
in his opinion, sound business judgment, his counterpart of the
close corporation often has a large total of his entire capital in-
vested in the business and has no ready market for his shares
should he desire to sell. He feels, understandably, that he is more
than a mere investor and that his voice should be heard concern-
ing all corporate activity. Without a shareholder agreement, spe-
cifically enforceable by the courts, insuring him a modicum of
control, a large minority shareholder might find himself at the
mercy of an oppressive or unknowledgeable majority. 2
2" Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HA v. L.
REv. 1532 (1960).
29 Del. Ch. 318, 335, 49 A.2d 603, 611 (Ch. 1946).
28 Conn. -, 220 A.2d 456 (1966).
35 Del. Ch. 599, 621, 123 A.2d 893, 905 (Ch. 1956).20In re Farm Industries, 41 Del. Ch. 379, 196 A.2d 582 (Ch. 1963).
2132 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964), reversing 45 Ii. App. 2d 452,
196 N.E.2d 5 (1964).32 id. at 27, 203 N.E.2d at 583-84. Two brothers owner 95% of the
stock. An agreement was executed which provided for equal control for
each family on the death of either brother. One of the brothers died, and
the other brother and his family refused to abide by the agreement. The
widow sued in equity for an accounting and for specific performance. The
19661
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Once a court decides to grant specific performance, there re-
mains one other problem-the proper scope of the remedy. In Ring-
ling and Galler the Court of Chancery went no further than simply
indicating that specific performance was proper. Weil did not stop
at this but actually directed shareholders to vote in a certain man-
ner to carry out the agreement. Such broad instructions may seem
to be an over-extension of the principles of specific performance
since courts will not normally direct the manner in which share-
holders are to vote their stock. 3 The instant case, however, only
represents the natural extension of all cases indicating that share-
holder voting agreements are specifically enforceable. The voting
directions given by the court did not require anything other than
that which would have been necessary under a simple decree of
specific performance. Further, by indicating the exact method for
performing the agreement, additional litigation may be avoided.
Weil, by specifically enforcing the agreement extended the func-
tional advantages of partnership management to the corporation, but
was unable to simultaneously provide, as does partnership law, a
method of free dissolution. The two goals are incompatible. The
pragmatic solution is to recognize that partnership law cannot, and
perhaps should not, be carried over in its entirety into the close
corporations. Each decision must be based on a factual analysis of
the case, and not on inflexible rules of law. Specific enforceability
of shareholder voting agreements must ultimately be a question of
judicial discretion.
JAmES NATHAN DUGGINS, JR.
Criminal Law-Psychiatric Examination of Prosecutrix in Rape Case
Most jurisdictions follow the common law rule that a defendant
charged with rape may be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated
intermediate court held that the agreement was in disregard of the Corpora-
tion Act, and reversed a trial court decision granting specific performance.
The supreme court remanded the case indicating specific performance should
be granted.
" Courts of equity do not usually direct shareholders on how to vote
their stock. "Equity can give such relief as is proper to its practice and
procedure, and cannot give voting directions... ." 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS § 2070, at 299 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952). Equity does not
have unlimited jurisdiction, and may exercise only supervising and regula-
tive power where there is a controlling statute. Thus equity cannot give
voting directions to shareholders of a company chartered under a state
statute. People v. Burke, 72 Colo. 486, 212 Pac. 837 (1923).
[Vol. 45
